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WALKING THE CLASS ACTION MAZE:
TOWARD A MORE FUNCTIONAL RULE 23
Robert G. Bone*
Over roughly the past fifteen years, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts
have limited access to class actions. Many of the more restrictive decisions-such
as Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., and Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes-are based on interpretations of Rule 23 and thus
fall within the power of the Advisory Committee and rulemaking process to modify.
This Article proposes revisions to Rule 23 designed to deal with some of these deci-
sions and to make the class action a more pragmatic and functional device. It
focuses on two areas: (1) the constraints imposed by fairness to absentees and due
process, and (2) the problem of strategic abuse associated with frivolous and weak
class action filings.
Responding in large part to concerns about fairness, due process, and legitimacy,
the Supreme Court has adopted a vague class "cohesion" requirement (Amchem),
an interpretive principle tethering the class action to outdated precedent (Ortiz),
and a strong indivisibility condition for (b)(2) certification (Wal-Mart). The prob-
lem is that none of these limitations is based on a clear understanding of what
fairness to absentees requires or how the individual day-in-court right can be recon-
ciled with representative litigation. As a result, the Court's decisions are poorly
reasoned and its restrictions inadequately justified. The Advisory Committee should
do what it can to correct these deficiencies, and this Article suggests a promising
approach. Furthermore, in response to concerns about the strategic filing of frivo-
lous and weak class action suits, federal judges have tightened the standard of
proof for certification. But they have done so without general agreement on the
normative stakes, and the result is a collection of inconsistent and relatively vague
standards. The Advisory Committee should clarify the law in this area by specify-
ing a standard of proof in the text of Rule 23 This Article suggests a useful
framework for doing so.
Finally, the Article briefly discusses some potential obstacles to Committee action,
including the advisability of overruling recent Supreme Court decisions, potential
constitutional problems, Rules Enabling Act constraints, transsubstantivity objec-
tions, and the ever-present risk of political controversy.
* G. Rollie White Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law. I wish to thank
participants in the Michigan Journal of Law Reform's Class Action Symposium for their
helpful questions and comments.
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INTRODUCTION
One hears dire predictions these days about the death or near
death of the federal class action. These concerns have intensified in
the wake of two recent Supreme Court decisions, Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Dukes' and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.2 Some commen-
tators believe that Wal-Mart seriously undermines employment
discrimination class actions and creates rough sailing for other class
actions as well. 3 And many see Concepcion as the end of most small-
claim class actions.4 Although some of the complaints are exagger-
ated, there is no question that these two decisions limit the
availability of the class action in federal court. However, they are
just recent installments in a long line of restrictive federal court
decisions that extends back almost fifteen years and that has greatly
limited access to the class action device. 5
There is hope for the class action, however. Except for Concepcion
and a few constitutional and statutory restrictions, most of the limit-
ing doctrines have been based on judicial interpretations of Rule
23.6 This means that the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules can
counteract the restrictive trend to some extent by amending Rule
23. This Article addresses what, if anything, the Committee should
do and what obstacles it is likely to face.
My main point is that any Committee effort to reform Rule 23
must build on a coherent theory of the class action. Neither the
Advisory Committee nor the federal judiciary has ever developed
1. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
2. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
3. See, e.g., Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications of Dukes v.
Wal-Mart, 106 Nw. U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 34, 37 (2011); Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class
Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 53-54), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2038985.
4. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 627 (2012); David S. Schwartz, Claim-
Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239, 266-68 (2012); Jean R. Sternlight,
Tsunami. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703,
708-09 (2012).
5. In addition, statutes such as the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA),
adopted in 1995, and the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), adopted in 2005, restrict the
availability of class actions to some extent. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2) (2006) (PSLRA's strict
pleading requirement); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1711-1715 (2006) (CAFA's regulation of class action
settlements).
6. The Supreme Court's Concepcion decision relies on the preemptive effect of the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act and therefore cannot be relaxed or reversed by revising Rule 23. It is not
clear, however, that Concepcion in fact dooms the small-claim class action. Class action waivers
might still be unenforceable when they have the effect of preventing all private enforcement
of the substantive law. The Supreme Court should shed some light on this issue with its
decision this term in the case of In Re Am. Express Merch. Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 212, 218 (2d Cir.
2012), cert. granted, 133 S.Ct. 594 (2012).
Toward a More Functional Rule 23
such a theory. The 1938 Advisory Committee relied on antiquated
precedent and drafted an extremely confusing Rule 23 as a result.
The 1966 Advisory Committee set out to cure that confusion but
ended up drafting a Rule with a number of puzzling features. 7 The
resulting muddle continues to plague Rule 23. The Wal-Mart deci-
sion is only the latest example. In Wal-Mart, the Court strengthened
the 23(a) (2) common question requirement without explaining
what function (a) (2) performs or why this previously unremarkable
provision should receive a more prominent role in the certification
analysis. Moreover, the Court did so for a class action certified
under (b) (2) even though the express terms of (b) (2) already re-
quire especially strong intra-class homogeneity without help from
(a) (2).
My purpose, however, is not to develop a theory of the class ac-
tion in this Article. Rather, my goal is to focus attention on the
need for such a theory and to sketch a general approach to formu-
lating one. In short, any attempt to revise Rule 23 must be based on
a coherent account of the functions the class action should per-
form, a clearer understanding of how representative litigation can
be reconciled with each party's right to a personal day in court, and
a sophisticated grasp of the strategic dynamics of class action
litigation.
Even with such a theory, the Advisory Committee will still face a
number of legal and practical obstacles to reform. The Constitu-
tion's Due Process Clause limits the Committee's power." The Rules
Enabling Act also imposes limits.9 Perhaps the most troubling obsta-
cle is practical. As the history of rulemaking efforts over the past
thirty years demonstrates, any attempt to alter Rule 23 is bound to
provoke interest group conflict and political controversy. Charting
a way through the thicket will take considerable skill. But it is worth
the effort.
The body of this Article is divided into three parts. Part I briefly
reviews the history of Rule 23 as background for the discussion in
the rest of the Article. Part II then focuses on two key problems with
the Rule as it was revised in 1966 and describes how courts have
7. For example, why does Rule 23(a) (2) impose a separate common question require-
ment when the provisions of Rule 23(b) already guarantee the existence of common
questions? What does 23(a) (3)'s typicality requirement add to the adequacy of representa-
tion that is already required by 23(a) (4)? Why does Rule 23(c) (2) require notice and opt out
for (b) (3) class actions when (a) (4) already requires adequacy of representation? Why does
the Rule limit notice and opt-out rights to (b)(3) and not also extend them to (b)(1) and
(b) (2)?
8. See infra Part III.B.2.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). See infra Part III.B.3.
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tried to handle these problems within the confines of a Rule poorly
designed to address them. Part III outlines an approach to Rule 23
reform, suggests some specific changes to the Rule, and briefly dis-
cusses problems with implementation.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF RULE 23
A. Original Rule 23
The original version of Rule 23 was adopted in 1938, when the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) were first promulgated.
Although most of the original FRCP were designed as pragmatic
and functional rules aimed at efficiently enforcing the substantive
law, Rule 23 was written in a highly abstract form organized around
rights-based classifications. Rule 23(a) authorized a class action
when "the character of the right" was (1) 'Joint, or common, or
secondary," (2) "several, and the object of the action is the adjudi-
cation of claims which do or may affect specific property," or (3)
"several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the
several rights and a common relief is sought."10 Moreover, the
preclusive effect of a class action depended on which rights-based
category it fit into. Class actions involving joint or common rights-
so-called "true class actions"-bound everyone in the class. Class ac-
tions involving several rights and specific property-so-called
"hybrid class actions"-bound class members only with respect to
the property at issue, and class actions involving several rights and
common questions and relief-so-called "spurious class actions"-
bound only those who chose to intervene.1
This is a puzzling way for the 1938 rule drafters to have written
Rule 23. These judges, lawyers, and scholars were pragmatic reform-
ers bent on ridding civil procedure of nineteenth century
technicalities that they believed had no functional value. 12 For ex-
ample, they jettisoned restrictive joinder rules and based permissive
10. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a) (1938).
11. SeeJames Wm. Moore & Marcus Cohn, Federal Class Actions-Jurisdiction and Effect of
Judgment, 32 ILL. L. REv. 555, 555-63 (1938). Professor Moore proposed that these preclusion
rules be included in original Rule 23, but the Committee chose not to do so out of fear that
specifying the binding effect of class judgments might be too substantive. See id. at 556. Nev-
ertheless, Moore included these preclusion rules in his highly regarded procedure treatise,
and as a result most courts ended up following them. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEEJR., Some Problems
of Equity, in THE THOMAS M. COOLEY LECTURES 251 (1950).
12. See generally Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal
Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. Rev. 1, 78-98 (1988)
(tracing the history of the twentieth century reform movement).
1100 VOL. 46:4
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joinder on more fuinctional common question and transaction tests;
they empowered the trial judge to carve up large lawsuits into more
convenient and efficient trial units; and they liberalized pleading
and expanded discovery so that lawsuits could be decided on the
substantive law and the facts rather than on technicalities. 13 Against
this pragmatic and functional background, Rule 23 stands out for
its striking use of rights-based formalisms and technical
classifications.
These rights-based categories made little sense in the increas-
ingly pragmatic legal world of the mid-twentieth century, and
judges often had difficulty classifying a right as joint, common, or
several.14 Moreover, federal judges sometimes Worked around the
Rule by characterizing rights as joint or common when the equities
of a case seemed to call for classwide preclusive effect.1 5
So why did the 1938 Advisory Committee draft such a formalistic
rule? I believe there are several reasons. For one thing, it is unlikely
that the original Committee worried too much about Rule 23 since
class actions were relatively rare in the early twentieth century.16
Also, the class action was not central to the procedural reform
agenda of the time. The joinder focus was on removing artificial
barriers to permissive joinder and empowering trial judges to use
their discretion to create efficient litigating units.1 7 The historic
purpose of the class action-or "representative suit," as it was
known at the time-was relatively narrow: to allow lawsuits to pro-
ceed withoutjoining necessary parties. 8 The idea of using the class
action as a preclusion device to aggregate related claims for effi-
ciency gains lay in the future.
Moreover, designing a functional class action rule was much
more difficult than reforming permissive joinder. Modernizing
joinder involved eliminating obvious common law and code techni-
calities and harnessing trial judge expertise. The class action was
more complicated because it implicated class members' rights and
13. See id. at 98-107; Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Back-
ground of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 691, 728-29 (1998).
14. See CHAFFEE, supra note 11, at 249, 251-52, 256-57; FED. R. Civ. P. 23, advisory com-
mittee's notes (1966).
15. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Burnham, 197 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1952) (questioning 1938 Rule
23's rights-based categories and recharacterizing a case as a hybrid class action that the dis-
trict court had treated as a spurious class action); FED. R. Crv. P. 23, advisory committee's
notes (1966).
16. See Charles E. Clark & Herbert Brownell, Jr., Joinder of Parties, 37 YALE L. J. 28, 62
(1928) (noting the limited application of the representative suit).
17. See Bone, supra note 12, at 98-107.
18. See Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the History of
Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213, 242-45 (1990).
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fairness values.19 Given uncertainty about how to address these fair-
ness issues and given the marginal importance of the class action at
the time, it is not surprising that the Advisory Committee chose to
track nineteenth century precedent rather closely.20
The original Rule 23, however, was doomed almost from the out-
set. Its formalistic framework and limited scope were holdovers
from a period that had already passed. Mid-twentieth-century ju-
rists, accustomed to thinking about legal rights in functional terms
and skeptical about abstract and universal definitions of legal con-
cepts not tied to purposes, chafed at Rule 23's formalism. It was
only a matter of time before the Advisory Committee would revisit
the Rule and revise it. It did so in the 1960s, and the result is the
modern version of Rule 23, which went into effect in 1966.
B. 1966 Rule 23
The 1966 revision eliminated the rights-based formalisms of the
1938 Rule and restructured it along more functional, policy-based
lines. 2' For example, Rule 23(b) (1) authorizes a class action when
individual litigation might create serious hardships for other class
members or for the defendant.22 Moreover, Rule 23(b) (2) allows
class actions to promote remedial efficacy by facilitating the grant
of a classwide injunctive remedy not possible-or at least much
more difficult-with individual suits. 23 And Rule 23(b) (3) autho-
rizes class actions that achieve efficiency and decisional consistency
19. Some key procedure reformers, including Charles Clark, the Reporter to the 1938
Advisory Committee, were unwilling to leave procedures that protected -parties' substantive
rights to trial judge discretion. See Bone, supra note 12, at 100.
20. James William Moore was responsible for drafting Rule 23, and it is clear that he
implemented his best understanding of representative suit precedent. SeeJames win. Moore
& Marcus Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32 ILL. L. REV. 307 (1937). It is worth mentioning that
the Advisory Committee also drafted Rule 19 (compulsory joinder) and Rule 24 (interven-
tion) to track precedent fairly closely and even used formalistic terminology-'joint interest"
and "indispensable party"-for Rule 19. See Bone, supra note 12, at 107-14; FED. R. Cirv. P. 24,
advisory committee's notes (1966). It is no coincidence that Rules 19 and 24, like Rule 23,
raise concerns about fairness to absentees. And it is also no coincidence that Rules 19 and 24
were revised in 1966, along with Rule 23, to eliminate formalisms and expand their applica-
tion along more functional lines. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, advisory committee's notes (1966).
21. See, e.g., Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497
(1968) [hereinafter Kaplan, Prefatory Note] ("The reform of Rule 23 was intended to shake
the law of class actions free of abstract categories contrived from such bloodless words as
joint,' 'common,' and 'several,' and to rebuild that law on functional lines responsive to
those recurrent life patterns which call for mass litigation through representatives.").
22. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23, advisory committee's notes, subdivision (b)(1) (1966).
23. See David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for the
Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 702-08 (2011) (explaining that the 1966 Committee
drafted (b) (2) to facilitate broad injunctive relief in desegregation suits).
1102 [VOL. 46:4
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by aggregating suits with common questions into a single adjudica-
tion, as well as class actions that promote private enforcement of
the substantive law by enabling litigation where individual suits
would not be cost justified.24
In order for the class action to serve these policy goals, class
members must be bound by the class judgment. Hence the new
Rule 23 was designed to be a classwide preclusion device rather
than a limited exception to mandatory joinder.25 As a result, the
Committee had to face squarely the due process and fairness-to-ab-
sentee issues that the 1938 Committee had dodged. It responded by
including subdivision (a) (4) based on the Supreme Court's pivotal
decision in Hansberny v. Lee, which held that due process of law is
satisfied if the interests of absentees are adequately represented. 26 It
also responded by assigning responsibility to the district judge to
look out for the interests of absent class members. In this regard,
the Committee added a new certification stage, at which the judge
could check representational adequacy before approving a class ac-
tion, and it also gave the judge a set of procedural tools to
safeguard absentee interests. 27
However, the 1966 Advisory Committee was not content to rely
solely on adequate representation and judicial supervision. It added
other requirements to Rule 23 that make much less sense from a
pragmatic and functional perspective. For example, the Committee
included a mystifying typicality requirement in (a) (3) and a seem-
ingly redundant common question requirement in (a) (2) .28
24. See Kaplan, Prefatory Note, supra note 21, at 497; Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of
the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARv. L. Rv.
356, 390 (1967) [hereinafter Kaplan, Civil Committee].
25. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23 advisory committee's notes, subdivision (c) (3) (1966).
26. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43 (1940). Rule 23(a) (4) requires that "the represen-
tative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." FED. R. Civ. P.
23(a) (4) (1966). This provision is normally satisfied if the representative has the capacity and
incentive to litigate vigorously and does not have any conflicting or antagonistic interests with
the class and if the class attorney is experienced, qualified, and competent. See Oplchenski v.
Parfums Givenchy Co., 254 F.R.D. 489, 498 (N.D. Il1. 2008); JEROLD S. SOLOV ET AL., 5-23
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTIcE-CiviL § 23.25 (2012).
27. Rule 23(c) (1), as originally adopted, stated that "the court shall determine by order
whether [the suit] is to be . . . maintained [as a class action]." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)
(1966); see also FED. R. Crv. P. 23(d) (1966) (furnishing the judge with a number of procedu-
ral tools). Moreover, the 1966 version of Rule 23(e) required judicial review and approval of
all class action settlements. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (1966).
28. Rule 23(a) (3) requires that "the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class," and Rule 23(a) (2) requires that "there are
questions of law or fact common to the class." FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a) (1966). No one quite
understands what distinct functions these requirements perform. A separate 23(a)(2) com-
mon question requirement seems unnecessary given that the requirements of each of the
23(b) subdivisions guarantee common questions. Id. Moreover, 23(a) (3) typicality seems un-
necessary given (a) (4)'s representational adequacy requirement. Id. Indeed, the Supreme
SUMMER 2013] 1103
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Moreover, it added notice and opt-out rights to the (b) (3) class ac-
tion to respect the "interests of individuals in pursuing their own
litigations,"2 9 but did not extend those same rights to (b) (1) and
(b) (2) to protect similar interests. 30
One is left to puzzle over these additional provisions. They were
almost certainly added because of concerns about the day-in-court
rights of absent class members and the legitimacy of class adjudica-
tion. The Committee assumed that the class had to exhibit internal
"homogeneity," "solidarity" or "cohesion," in addition to adequate
representation, before a class judgment could fairly bind absen-
tees. 3' This might explain the inclusion of (a) (2) and (a) (3), which
are proxies for cohesion. It probably also explains the decision to
confine notice and opt-out rights to (b) (3) class actions. The Com-
mittee believed that (b) (3) classes were less likely to be internally
cohesive and more likely to include members with strong interests
in individual control.3 2
The problem is that the Committee never justified its cohesive-
ness requirement in functional terms.3 3 In fact, it never clearly
defined what constitutes class "cohesion" or explained how cohe-
sion might address day-in-court concerns. 34 More generally, there is
no evidence that the Committee thought hard about the values that
the day in court serves or how those values can be accommodated
by litigation through a representative. Instead, it appears that the
Committee mainly looked for patterns in previous cases and relied
Court has said that (a) (2) and (a) (3) "tend to merge" and that they both "also tend to merge
with the adequacy-of-representation requirement." Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 158
n.13 (1982).
29. FED. R. Crv. P. 23 advisory committee's notes, subdivision (c) (2) (1966).
30. The Committee mentioned that "class-action treatment is not as clearly called for"
under the circumstances referred to in (b) (3). FED. R. Ctv. P. 23, advisory committee's notes,
subdivision (b)(3) (1966). But it did not clearly explain why this is so. After all, (b)(3) can
generate substantial social benefits: huge judicial economy gains, major reductions in delay
costs for plaintiffs, and remedies for small claimants that they cannot obtain on their own.
Although class action treatment might seem more compelling for (b) (1) and (b) (2), it is not
logically mandated. Nor is it qualitatively different insofar as practical benefits are concerned
from those applications of (b) (3) that make meaningful recovery possible for class members.
31. See Kaplan, Civil Committee, supra note 24, at 380 (1967) (referring to "homogeneity"
and "solidarity"); FED. R. Crv. P. 23, advisory committee's note, subdivision (b) (3) (1966)
(referring to class "cohesion"); see also Marcus, supra note 23, at 698-99 (citing records of the
Advisory Committee proceedings supporting this point, although not in an unqualified way).
32. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23, advisory committee's notes, subdivisions (b) (3), (c)(2) (1966);
Marcus, supra note 23, at 698-99.
33. Indeed, the typicality requirement is oddly formalistic in its focus on the similarity of
legal claims.
34. After all, the (b) (1) class action is mandatory with no right to opt out, yet the (b) (1)
limited fund class is the opposite of a cohesive or homogeneous class. See FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(1). The limited nature of the fund inherently pits one class member against the
others.
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on rough intuitions about which scenarios "naturally" or "necessa-
rily" warrant class treatment.35
Another shortcoming of Rule 23 has to do with the Committee's
failure to appreciate fully the power that the class action gives liti-
gating parties and their attorneys and the consequent risk of
strategic abuse. In an illuminating history of the 1966 revision and
its aftermath, Professor David Marcus explains that this failure was
due to two aspects of the reform effort: first, most Committee mem-
bers had modest ambitions for the revision, and second, many of
the substantive law and other developments associated with the
most controversial uses of the class action were not yet in place in
1966.36 Even the most radical revision, the creation of the new
23(b) (3) class action, prompted surprisingly little concern. One
Committee member, John P. Frank, did foresee some of the later
problems, but he was unable to persuade enough of the other
members. As a result, the Committee drafted Rule 23 without antic-
ipating the later uproar over class action abuse and without taking
specific steps to deal with the problems. Instead, it relied mostly on
the managerial discretion of the trial judge, and it did so without
seriously considering the informational and strategic obstacles to
effective judicial oversight.3 7
II. CLASS ACTION PROBLEMS AND THE LIMITS OF RULE 23
Courts have struggled with day-in-court and strategic abuse
problems ever since the late 1960s, and especially over the past fif-
teen years. The result is a series of restrictive class action decisions
that lack a coherent set of guiding principles. Most of these deci-
sions purport to be interpretations of Rule 23, but many bear only a
loose relationship to the Rule itself. The following discussion fo-
cuses on two areas: (1) efforts to make sense of the constraints that
fairness to absentees impose on class treatment, and (2) efforts to
address strategic abuse in the form of frivolous and weak class ac-
tion filings.
35. Kaplan, Civil Committee, supra note 24, at 386 (1967) ("[T]he Committee strove to
sort out the factual situations or patterns that had recurred in class actions and appeared
with varying degrees of convincingness to justify treatment of the class in solido," and it looked
for situations that "'naturally' or 'necessarily' called for unitary adjudication.").
36. David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm und Drang
1953-1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 12-13, 16-22), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/so3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2220452.
37. See generally Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28
CARDozo L. REv. 1961 (2007) (describing some of these obstacles).
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A. Fairness to Absentees
As we saw in Part I, the Supreme Court made the modern class
action possible by switching from a narrow fights-based framework
to a broader interest representation model. After Hansbery v. Lee, it
was possible to argue that absent class members could be bound to
a class judgment consistent with due process if their interests in the
litigation were adequately represented by the named plaintiffs and
the class attorney 8 However, the Hansberny Court did not clearly
explain how representational adequacy is compatible with the fun-
damental principle that all persons have a right to their own
personal day in court. Nor did it explain what specific conditions
must be satisfied for representation to be adequate.
The case law since 1966 has only added to the resulting confu-
sion. In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor3 9 for example, the
Supreme Court muddied the (b) (3) predominance analysis by
equating predominance with "class cohesiveness." According to
Amchem, " [t]he Rule 23(b) (3) predominance inquiry tests whether
proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by
representation," and "assure[s] the class cohesion that legitimizes
representative action in the first place." 40
This interpretation of the predominance requirement is surpris-
ing. It conflicts with the most reasonable account of the 1966
Committee's intent. Although it is difficult to tell precisely what the
Committee had in mind, there is strong evidence that it meant for
the predominance requirement to serve as a proxy for judicial
economy gains from class treatment.4' By equating predominance
with class cohesion and then tying class cohesion to the legitimacy
38. SeeHansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940) ("this Court isjustified in saying that
there has been a failure of due process only in those cases where it cannot be said that the
procedure adopted, fairly insures the protection of the interests of absent parties who are to
be bound by it").
39. 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997).
40. Id.
41. The Committee Note states that "[iut is only when this predominance exists that
economies can be achieved by means of the class-action device." FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory
committee's notes, subdivision (b) (3) (1966). It goes on to illustrate the point with the exam-
ple of "a 'mass accident' resulting in injuries to numerous persons" that generates many
individual questions. Id. The problem with class treatment in such a case is that it "would
degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried." Id. In other words, while class
adjudication of common questions saves litigation costs, too many individual questions focus
too much attention on individual cases, undermining the efficiency benefits of class
treatment.
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of adjudicative representation, the Amchem Court enlists predomi-
nance to do due process and fairness work as well. 42 The problem
is that the Court did not explain how class cohesiveness promotes
fairness or serves day-in-court values, or even why cohesiveness
should be measured in terms of common versus individual ques-
tions at all.
The Amchem Court's focus on cohesiveness has spawned a confus-
ing body of case law.43  Some courts have found (b)(3)
predominance satisfied even when common questions are resolved
before certification. 44 In one such case, the court, citing Amchem,
reasoned that the mere existence of common questions was rele-
vant to cohesiveness-and thus to predominance-even though the
parties had stipulated answers to those questions so there could be
no judicial economy gains from class treatment.45 Moreover, some
courts have extended the cohesiveness requirement to (b) (2) class
actions despite the fact that the text of (b) (2) says nothing about
42. See Anchem, 521 U.S. at 621 (noting that the requirements in 23(a) and (b) "focus
court attention on whether a proposed class has sufficient unity so that absent members can
fairly be bound by decisions of class representatives."). In fact, if the Amchem Court had con-
ceived predominance in terms of judicial economy, it would have had considerable difficulty
justifying a serious look at predominance when certifying a settlement class action like
Amchem. Settlement class actions, by their nature, are never litigated, so judicial economy
gains are irrelevant. In fact, the Amchem Court held that manageability need not be consid-
ered in the certification decision for precisely this reason-because settlement obviated all
manageability concerns-and the same is true for judicial economy. See id. at 620.
43. It is worth mentioning that the dissenting opinion ofJustices Ginsburg and Breyer,
joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, in a recent case, Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct.
1426, 185 L. Ed. 2d 515, 524 (2013), adds even more confusion to (b) (3). After quoting the
Amchem passage that equates predominance with cohesiveness, these dissenters go on to sug-
gest that predominance is about judicial economy: "when adjudication of questions of
liability common to the class will achieve economies of time and expense, the predominance
standard is generally satisfied even if damages are not provable in the aggregate." 185 L. Ed.
2d at 526. This is especially puzzling given that Justice Ginsburg authored the Court's opin-
ion in Amchem.
44. See, e.g., In re Nassau Cnty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 227-28 (2d Cir. 2006);
Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 299 (1st Cir. 2000) ("[T]he fact that
an issue has been resolved on summaryjudgment does not remove it from the predominance
calculus."); 2 WiLLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS AcriONS § 4:51 (5th ed.
2012).
45. In re Nassau Cnty, 461 F.3d, at 228-29. The court in In Re Nassau County struggled to
certify a (b) (3) class action out of concern that many individual class members were unlikely
to sue on their own. See id. This concern fits one of the purposes of (b) (3), which is supposed
to enable enforcement of the substantive law as well as achieve judicial economy gains. How-
ever, the enforcement goal has nothing to do with cohesiveness or predominance. Rule 23
would be much improved if (b) (3) were revised to break out the two distinct class action
purposes and set out rules appropriate for each.
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cohesion or predominance. 46 Indeed, some of these cases focus di-
rectly on class cohesion rather than on (b) (2)'s express
requirements. 47
Two years after Amchem, in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,48 the Supreme
Court, concerned about fairness to absentees and due process, de-
cided to tether the (b) (1) (B) limited fund class action to outdated
and formalistic representative suit precedent. In particular, the Or-
tiz Court held that the "historical antecedents" of the limited fund
class action imposed limitations that the modern (b) (1) (B) class
action also had to satisfy. 49 The fact is that none of these limitations
actually appear in Rule 23(b) (1) (B), 50 and engrafting them onto
Rule 23 restricts its ability to respond pragmatically to new situa-
tions manifesting the same type of unfairness that the Rule was
meant to address. 5' Worse yet, the Court did all of this without ex-
plaining how the historically-based restrictions improve fairness to
absentees or when historical interpretation might limit other appli-
cations of Rule 23.52
46. Some argue that stronger cohesion is necessary for (b) (2) than for (b) (3) because
(b)(2) class members have no opt-out rights. See, e.g., Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d
127, 142-43 (3d Cir. 1998); RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 44, § 4:33.
47. See, e.g., Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255, 263-64 (3d Cir. 2011); Barnes, 161
F.3d at 143; see also Avritt v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 1023, 1035 (8th Cir. 2010)
(noting that a (b) (2) class is "generally bound together through preexisting or continuing
legal relationships or by some significant common trait such as race or gender."); cf RUBEN-
STEIN ET AL., supra note 44, § 4:34 (arguing that courts misunderstand the way (b) (2) benefits
class members when they demand stronger cohesion to certify a (b) (2) class action).
48. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
49. See id. at 841-42. See also id. at 845-48 (noting that a restrictive interpretation of the
Rule helps to avoid due process and Rules Enabling Act problems). The three limitations are
as follows: first, that the inadequacy of the fund be determined by comparing the total of all
the claims with the fund set at its maximum; second, that "the whole of the inadequate
fund... be devoted to the overwhelming claims" without any of it being held back to benefit
the defendant or give the defendant "a better deal than seriatim litigation would have pro-
duced"; and third, that all the claimants must be "treated equitably among themselves" with
equity presumptively a pro rata distribution and without any claimant receiving special treat-
ment. Id. at 838-41.
50. See id. at 842 ("It is true, of course, that the text of Rule 23 (b) (1) (B) is on its face
open to a more lenient limited fund concept. .. ").
51. This was the main point made by Justices Breyer and Stevens in dissent. See id. at
865-68. They stressed the unusual nature of the asbestos crisis, the fact that the Ortiz class
members were likely to fare worse outside the settlement class, and the fact that Rule
23(b) (1) (B) was designed to handle this general type of problem. Id.
52. At least one commentator voiced a similar concern shortly after the Ortiz decision.
John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability; Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representa-
tive Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 370, 372 (2000) ("[T]he clearest message in Ortiz is that
any innovation in class action procedures that departs from 'the traditional norm' is hereaf-
ter likely to be disfavored.").
Toward a More Functional Rule 23
My final example is the recent case of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, a huge Title VII class action seeking injunctive relief, declara-
tory relief, and back pay.53 The Wal-Mart Court held that a lawsuit
certified under 23(b) (2) is almost exclusively limited to claims for
"indivisible" injunctive and declaratory relief-such as a single de-
cree that benefits all class members at once-and cannot include
"individualized" monetary relief unless that relief is "incidental" to
the injunctive or declaratory relief sought.5 4 The Court viewed back
pay as a form of individualized relief that was not merely incidental
to the injunctive and declaratory relief sought in Wal-Mart, and
therefore the plaintiffs could not use (b) (2) to recover their back
pay but instead had to meet the requirements of (b) (3).
The Court based its holding on an interpretation of Rule 23-
just as it did in Amchem and Ortiz-but its interpretation was obvi-
ously influenced by due process concerns.5 5 For example, the Court
assumed that class members with claims for individualized mone-
tary relief ought to receive the additional protections that (b) (3)
affords, such as notice and opt-out rights, usually associated with
due process values.5 6 But the Court did not explain why the individ-
ualized nature of the relief made all the difference.
All three cases were huge and sprawling class actions seeking
broad relief, and all three presented potentially serious problems.
Moreover, Amchem and Ortiz were settlement-only class actions
aimed at securing global peace, and they involved settlements that,
depending on one's perspective, more closely resembled legislation
or agency regulation than a product of adjudication. Perhaps the
unusual nature of these cases demanded special rules, and the
Court responded creatively by adapting Rule 23 provisions to do
work they were not originally designed to do. Even so, the Court
did not limit its holdings to the particular type of class action before
it. Nor did it explain exactly how its restrictive rules satisfied the
due process concerns that motivated them. Without a clear expla-
nation, future courts are left to guess at whether cohesiveness is
53. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557-58 (2011).
54. Id. at 2557; see id. at 2558-59 (noting that (b) (2) is not available when "each individ-
ual class member would be entitled to a different injunction or declaratory judgment against
the defendant" or to an individualized monetary award).
55. See id. at 2557-59 ("In the context of a class action predominantly for money dam-
ages we have held that absence of notice and opt-out violates due process. While we have
never held that to be so where the monetary claims do not predominate, the serious possibil-
ity that it may be so provides an additional reason not to read Rule 23(b) (2) to include the
monetary claims here.") (citations omitted).
56. See id. at 2559.
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sufficient, traditional representative suit precedent relevant, or the
remedy sufficiently indivisible. 7
B. Strategic Abuse
The other area where the 1966 version of Rule 23 fell short is in
controlling strategic abuse. One type of abuse involves agency
problems that can result in a collusive settlement enriching the at-
torney at the expense of the class.58  Although the 2003
amendments took steps to address this concern, it warrants further
attention in any attempt to reform Rule 23.
There is, however, another type of strategic abuse that I wish to
focus on here. By making massive damages liability turn on the out-
come of a single suit, the class action can increase litigation risks so
dramatically that defendants might settle even frivolous or weak
class actions rather than take their chances at trial.59 Although
some commentators question the magnitude of this risk, there is no
doubt that concerns about improper settlement leverage have had
a major impact on class action decisions since the late 1990s. 60
Probably the most significant impact is on the standard of proof for
class certification. Many courts have stiffened this standard, and
made certification more difficult to obtain, in an effort to avoid cer-
tifying meritless and weak class actions and thereby reduce the
pressure on defendants to settle.
57. In its recent Amgen decision, holding that plaintiffs need not prove materiality to rely
on a fraud-on-the-market theory at the class certification stage, the Court invokes the cohe-
siveness requirement but offers no additional clarification of the concept. Amgen Inc. v.
Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191, 1196-97 (2013). Indeed, Amgen in-
volved an unusual situation: the core issue, materiality, was not only a condition for fraud-on-
the-market, but also a pivotal liability issue. See id. at 1195-96 (noting that a failure to prove
materiality not only excludes a fraud-on-the-market theory but also ends the litigation on the
merits).
58. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 52, at 371-72; Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart"
and "Blackmail" Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1377,
1390-91 (2000).
59. For an analysis of the strategic dynamics, see Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class
Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 DuKE L.J. 1251, 1296-302 (2002).
60. For a more skeptical view of frivolous settlements, see, for example, Charles Silver,
"We're Scared to Death". Class Certfication and Blackmai 78 N.Y.U. L. Rrv. 1357 (2003). Critics
of the class action have complained about unjustified settlement leverage almost since the
beginning of the modern class action in 1966. See, e.g., Milton Handler, The Shiftrom Substan-
tive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71
COLJM. L. Rv. 1, 8-9 (1971). But this concern moved center stage in the 1990s when judge
Posner highlighted it in a widely publicized decision, In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51
F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995), and the Fifth Circuit stressed it one year later in Castano v. Ameri-
can Tobacco Co. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
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Tightening the certification standard of proof implicates particu-
larly difficult issues when the merits of a case overlap with
certification requirements. Some Rule 23 requirements, such as
(a) (1) numerosity, can be decided without consulting the merits.
But others, such as (b) (3) predominance, overlap significantly with
merits issues. To determine predominance, for example, a judge
must assess the relative importance of the common and individual
questions. And to do that, she has to be able to predict how the
lawsuit will unfold and how the plaintiff will prove his case at trial. 6'
The question is how confident the judge must be that the common
issues supporting predominance have sufficient merit to actually
feature prominently in the litigation of the case.
To illustrate, consider a securities fraud class action. Individual
reliance is a necessary element of a plaintiffs prima facie case for
securities fraud. If each plaintiff had to prove that she actually re-
lied on the misrepresentations, few damages class actions could be
certified. The class action would have to be brought under (b) (3),
but (b) (3)'s predominance requirement would be very difficult to
satisfy because reliance normally varies with individual circum-
stances. One way to solve this problem is to use a fraud-on-the-
market theory. A fraud-on-the-market theory creates a rebuttable
presumption of classwide reliance when securities are traded in an
efficient market, and this makes it unnecessary for class members to
prove individual reliance.62 The question for thejudge at the certifi-
cation stage is what burden the named plaintiff must meet to
demonstrate the availability of a fraud-on-the-market theory. Is it
enough for the plaintiff simply to allege the theory? Or must she
provide some evidence to support it, or maybe even prove it by a
preponderance of the evidence?
Prior to 2000, many district judges relied mainly on the plaintiffs
allegations for certification-related merits issues. When they consid-
ered evidence, they usually required only minimal evidentiary
support. These judges reasoned that it was better to err on the side
of granting certification than denying it, because a denial might
doom the litigation and because any certification error could be
61. See, e.g., Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001) (not-
ing that the manageability factor for 23(b)(3) certification can require choice of law
determinations based on the merits); Bone & Evans, supra note 59, at 1269 (discussing this
point).
62. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). To use a fraud on the market theory,
the plaintiff must also prove that the misleading information is material and sufficiently pub-
lic to affect share price, although materiality need not be demonstrated at the certification
stage. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1192-93, 1197 (2013).
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corrected later by decertifying the class.63 Starting with a Seventh
Circuit decision in 2001, the federal courts of appeals began to im-
pose stricter proof requirements. 64 Though not always explicit
about their reasons, these courts were clearly influenced by a desire
to prevent unjustified settlement leverage in weak and frivolous
class action suits.6 5
The case law on the certification standard of proof, however, is in
disarray. The problem is that Rule 23 says nothing very helpful
about the issue.6 6 This leaves the courts of appeals free to apply
their own views of sound class action policy, and those views differ.
The result is a confusing and inconsistent body of decisional law.
For example, one panel of the Third Circuit has taken a particularly
strict approach to the burden, holding that the plaintiff must
demonstrate all Rule 23 certification requirements by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, including any certification-related merits
issues and issues that involve expert testimony.67 Other courts seem
less strict.6 These more generous courts still require evidence and
63. For an analysis and brief survey of the different approaches before 2001, see Bone &
Evans, supra note 59, at 1268-76. Judges also argued that the Supreme Court decision in
Eisenv. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), barred an inquiry into the merits, but this so-
called Eisen Rule was abolished by the Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541,
2552 n.6 (2011).
64. See Szabo, 249 F.3d 672; Klonoff, supra note 3, at 23 (treating Szabo as a turning
point).
65. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated this point clearly in an opinion that im-
posed a demanding standard of proof:
In some cases, class certification "may force a defendant to settle rather than incur the
costs of defending a class action and run the risk of potentially ruinous liability." Ac-
cordingly, the potential for unwarranted settlement pressure "is a factor we weigh in
our certification calculus." The Supreme Court recently cautioned that certain anti-
trust class actions may present prime opportunities for plaintiffs to exert pressure
upon defendants to settle weak claims.
In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2008) (citations omit-
ted); accord In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 26 (1st Cir.
2008); Unger v. Amedisys, Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 322 (5th Cir. 2005); Szabo, 249 F.3d at 675-76;
see also Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 591 (9th Cir. 2010) ("Nearly every circuit
to consider the issue.., has recognized the practical importance of the certification decision
as leverage for settlement . . . ."), rev'd 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). Another reason for a stiffer
burden is to avoid the waste of investing in a class action that plaintiffs cannot win. See In re
New Motor Vehicles, 522 F.3d at 29. Given that virtually all class actions settle, however, this
cannot be the main purpose.
66. Some courts have tried to find guidance in the 2003 amendments to Rule 23, but
their interpretations are extremely strained. See, e.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at
318-20 (relying on Rule 23(c)(1)(A) and (c)(1)(C)).
67. In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 320-25; see also Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div.
Pension Fund v. Bombardier, Inc., 546 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir. 2008); In re IPO Sec. Litig., 471
F.3d 24, 29-32 (2d Cir. 2006).
68. See, e.g., Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182, 198-200 (3d Cir. 2011) ("Nothing
in Hydrogen Peroxide requires plaintiffs to prove their case at the class certification
Toward a More Functional Rule 23
insist on a "rigorous analysis," including a merits review when rele-
vant to certification.69 But they tend to be less demanding and more
willing to credit allegations with weaker evidentiary support.70
These different approaches reflect different views about the value
of class actions, the seriousness of the settlement leverage problem,
and the desirability of incurring greater litigation costs and burdens
at the certification stage.71
The Supreme Court addressed the standard of proof briefly in
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes but did little to resolve the core con-
flict. The Wal-Mart Court rejected what it called "a mere pleading
standard," and held that "[a] party seeking class certification must
affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the Rule-that is, he
must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numer-
ous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc."7 2 Moreover, the
Court stressed the need for a "rigorous analysis," including an in-
quiry into the merits when relevant to certification.73
However, the Court did not specify any particular standard of
proof-whether plausibility, preponderance, or some other stan-
dard. The majority's strict attitude toward plaintiffs' evidence in
Wal-Mart might foreshadow adoption of a demanding standard
more generally. 74 But Wal-Mart was an unusual class action in many
ways, and one should be careful about inferring too much from the
Court's approach. 75 Two more recent Supreme Court decisions
stage . . . ."), rev'd, 133 S.Ct. 1426 (2013); Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669
F.3d 802, 818-19 (7th Cir. 2012) (reversing certification denial and criticizing the district
judge for applying too strict an approach that "asked not for a showing of common ques-
tions, but for a showing of common answers to those questions"). Although the Supreme
Court reversed the Third Circuit's decision in Behrend, see infra note 77, the appellate court's
opinion is still a good example of more liberal attitudes toward certification.
69. See, e.g., Behrend, 655 F.3d at 190.
70. Because courts tend to discuss these issues in rather vague and general language, it
can be difficult to determine exactly how strict a court's preferred burden is. However, the
language and tone of an opinion often signals a court's views. Compare id. at 197, 199-200
(noting that the job of the court is not to decide issues on the merits), with In re Hydrogen
Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 316-21 (stressing the importance of deciding certification-related merits
issues by a preponderance of the evidence).
71. See, e.g., Behrend, 655 F.3d at 199-200 & n.10 (noting that "nothing in [Hydrogen
Peroxide] indicated that class certification hearings were to become actual trials in which fac-
tual disputes are to be resolved" and citing "recent scholarship" critical of the "trend towards
converting certification decisions into mini trials").
72. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011).
73. Id. at 2551-52.
74. See id. at 2553-56.
75. Wal-Mart is the nation's largest private employer, see id. at 2547, and the Wal-Mart
class was huge, sprawling, and diverse. As originally certified, the class consisted of about 1.5
million Wal-Mart employees spread over 3,400 stores nationwide. See id. Moreover, the plain-
tiffs alleged a controversial structural discrimination theory. See Richard A. Nagareda, Class
Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof 84 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 97, 156-59 (2009).
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send mixed signals. Language in the Court's Amgen opinion might
signal a somewhat less demanding approach,7 6 but language in the
Court's Comcast opinion seems to cut the other way.7 7 Especially
given the Court's lack of clarity on the subject, it is important that
the Advisory Committee amend Rule 23 to address the certification
standard of proof explicitly. As I explain below, the Committee is in
a better position than the Court to consider the relevant empirical
evidence and conduct a global normative analysis.
III. REFORMING RULE 23
In the following discussion, I present an approach to Rule 23
reform that addresses the problems identified in Part 11.78 I do not
set out specific rule language or even advocate a particular position
on the issues, although I indicate my own views at times. My pri-
mary purpose is to chart a promising course toward sensible
reform.
The key idea is to make Rule 23 a thoroughly functional and
pragmatic rule. The 1966 Advisory Committee went some distance
along this road. It replaced the rights-based formalism of the 1938
Rule with a more pragmatic and functional approach. But the Com-
mittee did not go far enough.
76. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1201 (2013)
("Amgen's argument, if embraced, would necessitate a mini-trial on the issue of materiality at
the class-certification stage. Such preliminary adjudications would entail considerable ex-
penditures of judicial time and resources, costs scarcely anticipated by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(c) (1) (A) . . . ."); see also id. at 1191 (stressing that (b) (3) predominance focuses
on common "questions," not "answers").
77. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013). The majority held that the plain-
tiffs did not do enough to show that the (b) (3) predominance requirement for certification
was satisfied because they failed to demonstrate that damages traceable to their theory of
antitrust impact could be proved on a classwide basis. Id. at 1433-35. The Court's opinion
sounds a relatively strict note, although it lacks specifics on the precise standard of proof.
The majority repeats Wal-Mart's admonitions that Rule 23 "does not set forth a mere plead-
ing standard," that the party seeking certification "'must affirmatively demonstrate his
compliance' with Rule 23," that the certification inquiry "will frequently entail 'overlap with
the merits of the plaintiff's underlying claim,'" and that class certification requires a "rigor-
ous analysis." Id. at 1432 (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011)). The
majority also noted that the plaintiff must demonstrate "through evidentiary proof" that one
of the prongs of 23(b) is satisfied and that the district court has a duty to "take a close look"
at (b) (3) predominance. Id.
78. 1 focus on two areas, but these are not the only ones that the Committee should
address. For example, the 23(b) pigeonholes should also be revised to better map the differ-
ent social benefits from class treatment. In particular, it might make sense to craft a separate
provision for small-claim class actions and perhaps also for settlement class actions. Moreo-
ver, attorney-class agency problems need careful attention.
Toward a More Functional Rule 23
A. Some Suggestions for Reform
1. Fairness to Absentees: Cohesiveness and Indivisibility
The best way to understand what cohesiveness and indivisibility
have to do with fairness to absentees and the day-in-court right is to
view them through the lens of a process-oriented rather than an
outcome-oriented theory of participation. 79 An outcome-oriented
theory values participation for its effect on outcome quality. In the
class action context, this theory demands that the class representa-
tive and class attorney have interests in the litigation that align with
those of the class as well as incentives and resources to litigate vigor-
ously.8 0 Rule 23(a) (4) addresses these factors directly, and there is
no obvious reason why cohesiveness and remedial indivisibility are
needed as well.
Process-oriented theory, by contrast, views participation as neces-
sary to respect the dignity and autonomy of those affected by
litigation or to make adjudication legitimate-entirely apart from
any effect on outcome quality. Process-oriented participation poses
a serious challenge to the class action. It is difficult to understand
how representation can substitute for personal participation when
dignity or legitimacy demands a personal day in court. This is where
cohesiveness and indivisibility are supposed to do their work. The
underlying notion seems to rely on a rough intuition that the
strength of the participation right somehow varies with the degree
of individuality class members possess and that class members have
little individuality, and thus only a weak claim to individual control,
when the class consists of a cohesive pre-existing group. The prob-
lem is how to flesh out this intuition in a rigorous way.8'
This is not the place to examine the intuition carefully. The fol-
lowing discussion briefly sketches the type of analysis that should be
done. The first point to note is that, if the intuition makes any sense
at all, it cannot be because all class members share the same or
79. See generally Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with Contractarian
Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REv. 485, 508-11 (2003) (contrasting outcome-ori-
ented and process-oriented theories).
80. For a defense of this point, see Robert G. Bone, The Puzzling Idea of Adjudicative
Representation: Lessons for Aggregate Litigation and Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 577,
580-89 (2011).
81. In the somewhat different context of nonclass aggregations, Professor Burch has
argued for a view of cohesiveness based on actual group member interactions and decisions
that, she claims, trigger obligations of solidarity and membership. Elizabeth Chamblee
Burch, Litigating Together: Social, Moral, and Legal Obligations, 91 B.U. L. REv. 87, 106-11
(2011). Whatever the merits of this position, it does not translate well to the class action since
most class members participate only through representatives they do not choose.
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similar subjective preferences or goals for the litigation. They al-
most certainly do not. For example, attitudes toward risk vary across
class members in almost every class action, and these attitudes can
affect litigation and settlement preferences.8 2 Even in a (b) (2) civil
rights class action, class members can hold different preferences
about the scope of injunctive relief-and some might wish not to
sue at all.83 The same is true in a particularly dramatic way for the
(b) (1) (B) limited fund class action. The fact that the fund is inade-
quate to satisfy all claims necessarily means that class members have
conflicting preferences: each would like more of the fund even
when others have less.
Nor does it make sense to focus on legal similarities among class
members. This is what (a) (2) commonality and (a) (3) typicality do,
and it is also how the Amchem Court viewed predominance as a mea-
sure of class cohesiveness. But it is difficult to see how sharing
common questions of law or fact, no matter how numerous, or as-
serting claims that arise from the same dispute and involve similar
legal theories makes it fair to deny a class member the right to liti-
gate her own lawsuit in her own way. It is simply false to assume that
a class representative will make the same litigation strategy choices
as other class members just because she asserts a similar legal claim
or theory.8
4
Even this brief analysis suggests two important revisions of Rule
23. First, (a) (2) commonality and (a) (3) typicality should be elimi-
nated. The 1966 Committee never provided a convincing
justification for their inclusion, and they bear no obvious relation-
ship to process-oriented participation values. Second, a revised Rule
23 should make clear that (b) (3)'s predominance requirement has
nothing to do with fairness to absentees. Predominance is not
needed to satisfy outcome-oriented participation, and it has no con-
nection to process-oriented dignitary values. Therefore, its only
function should be to serve as a proxy for the judicial economy
gains from aggregation.
Remedial indivisibility is a different matter. I have argued else-
where that the right to a personal day in court is not triggered in a
82. Risk-averse class members will favor less risky litigation strategies and be more eager
to settle than risk-takers. See Coffee, supra note 52, at 389-90.
83. See Marcus, supra note 23, at 709-10; see also Burch, supra note 81, at 111.
84. Professor Hines argues that individuals with similar claims can trust their class repre-
sentative to make "litigation resource and strategic decisions" that "serve their interests" and
that, as a result, cohesiveness supports an inference of consent to representation. Laura J.
Hines, The Dangerous Allure of the Issue Class Action, 79 IND. L.J. 567, 594-98 (2004). I disagree.
The fact that A and B have similar claims provides no assurance that A will make the same
strategic decisions as B or even take B's interests into account. Moreover, I don't see how
consent follows from any of these assumptions.
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strong way in those cases where the legal remedy targets a class qua
class and confers benefits and burdens on class members only indi-
rectly by virtue of their being members of the class. 85 Remedial
indivisibility might refer to this principle if indivisibility means that
the remedy targets the class as a group. But if this is so, remedial
indivisibility must be understood in the correct way. It must refer to
a situation where the judge does not single out any group member
for individual treatment but instead acts on the class as a whole.
Rule 23 should be written in a way that makes this connection clear.
Finally, the day-in-court right as reflected in litigation practice is
not as absolute as the Supreme Court seems to think it is. I have
argued in other writing that the right is best viewed as contextual,
defined by a balance of factors including its effect on other litigants
and to some extent the judicial economy benefits achieved by limit-
ing it.86 If I am correct about this, there is much more room for the
(b) (3) class action than previously assumed. Indeed, there might
even be room for a mandatory (b) (3) class action designed to re-
dress major litigation imbalance, to prevent serious delay costs for
some class members, or even to save litigation costs when those sav-
ings are large enough.
The important point is that the Advisory Committee should con-
duct a rigorous analysis along the lines sketched here. In particular,
Rule 23 must be revised with an eye not only to the benefits of class
treatment, but also to the functional values served by individual par-
ticipation and the day-in-court right, as properly understood.
2. Strategic Abuse
The Committee should also add a provision to Rule 23 that sets
out the standard of proof for certification. Elsewhere, I have out-
lined a way to determine the optimal standard.87 Since the primary
goal is to avoid certifying weak and frivolous class actions, the Advi-
sory Committee should apply an error-cost analysis. More precisely,
the Committee should consider four factors relevant to evaluating
expected error costs: (1) the likelihood that a more lenient stan-
dard will lead to the grant of certification in weak or frivolous class
action suits (which, in turn, depends on the fraction of suits that
85. Bone, supra note 80, at 610-14.
86. Id. at 614-24.
87. See Bone & Evans, supra note 59, at 1278-80; Robert G. Bone, Sorting Through the
Certification Muddle, 63 VAND. L. REv. EN BANG 105, 112-15 (2010).
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are weak or frivolous); (2) the settlement leverage that an errone-
ous certification is likely to confer and the social cost of the skewed
settlements that might result; (3) the likelihood that a stricter stan-
dard will lead to denial of certification in meritorious class action
suits; and (4) the cost of an erroneous denial in frustrating class
action goals.88
One way to implement this approach for merits issues relevant at
the certification stage is to adopt a standard of proof that operates
like the substantial likelihood of success test for the grant of a pre-
liminary injunction.8 9 In the preliminary injunction setting, the
plaintiffs burden for establishing a likelihood of success varies on a
sliding scale with the expected error costs from granting versus de-
nying an injunction. One could apply a similar sliding scale to the
certification standard of proof. For example, consider a civil rights
case in which the underlying substantive interest has high social
value and there is a serious risk that denial of certification might
frustrate effective vindication of the right. In such a case, the judge
might impose a relatively lenient burden unless the defendant is
able to show that the cost of an erroneous certification in terms of
improper settlement leverage is very high.
Alternatively, the Committee might adopt a relatively strict stan-
dard of proof and carve out categorical exceptions. These
exceptions would apply to general types of cases, like civil rights
class actions, that tend to pose particularly serious risks of high so-
cial costs from erroneous certification denials.90
Furthermore, the Committee should be careful to coordinate its
choice of certification standard with other elements of the procedu-
ral system that serve related purposes. In particular, the Committee
should coordinate with the stricter pleading burden that the Su-
preme Court adopted in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcrofi v.
Iqbal.9' The Twombly Court justified its plausibility standard in part
as a way to screen frivolous and weak antitrust class actions early in
88. See Bone & Evans, supra note 59 at 1313-19 (outlining an error cost and process cost
critique of the Eisen Rule).
89. See id. at 1277-80.
90. Process costs matter as well. These include the parties' litigation costs as well as judi-
cial decision costs. Expected process costs depend on two factors: (1) the number of
certification motions under a strict versus a more lenient standard, and (2) the cost of litigat-
ing a certification motion under the different standards. For example, if class action filings
decline with a stricter standard of proof because plaintiffs are more pessimistic about success,
the number of certification motions should decline as well. However, a stricter standard also
requires more preparation, more evidence, longer hearings, and longer deliberation time.
These two effects pull in opposite directions, and how they resolve on balance depends on
the type of case.
91. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007).
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litigation.92 Insofar as this strict pleading standard already performs
a screening function, there might be no need for-and it might not
be a good idea to adopt-a strict certification standard as well.
B. Obstacles to Reform
In this section, I briefly discuss potential obstacles to reform. By
doing so, I hope to convince the skeptical reader that major reform
is possible and that there is still value in attempting it even when
the effort is ultimately unsuccessful.
1. Supreme Court Precedent
Many of the reforms discussed above involve reversing or modify-
ing Supreme Court precedent. Because these precedents are based
on interpretations of Rule 23, the Committee has the power to dis-
place them by amending the Rule. Nevertheless, one might worry
about reversing a Supreme Court decision that itself was based on
judgments of principle or policy, especially when the decision is
fairly recent. For example, it might seem a bold move to eliminate
the (a) (2) common question requirement or tinker with (b) (2) in-
divisibility so soon after the Wal-Mart decision.
This is an understandable concern, but it should not stand in the
way of Committee action. The Advisory Committee can learn from
what the Court has done, but it should not treat the Court's deci-
sions as a bar to sensible reform. The Committee's job is to craft the
best possible procedural rules within constitutional and statutory
limits, and it is better positioned than the Court to gather and eval-
uate the necessary empirical information, hear from affected
constituencies, and assess the consequences of a rule in light of its
global effects on the procedural system as a whole.93 Perhaps the
Supreme Court's well-considered judgments about moral principle
should receive greater weight, but the Court has never clearly iden-
tified the moral principles that underlie the day-in-court right.
92. 550 U.S. at 557-59. Moreover, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act imposes a
strict pleading standard for certain elements of a federal securities fraud claim in order to
screen frivolous and weak filings. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006).
93. See Bone, supra note 37, at 1989-90, 1995-96, 2001 (discussing advantages of the
court rulemaking process).
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2. Due Process
Constitutional constraints are a more serious matter. Although
the holdings in Amchem, Ortiz, and Wal-Mart are based on Rule 23,
the Court in all three cases suggested that constitutional due pro-
cess concerns lurked in the background. The Wal-Mart Court, for
example, indicated in dictum that notice and opt-out rights might
be constitutionally required whenever monetary relief is sought.94 If
this dictum ever becomes law, any effort to make small-claim class
actions mandatory-to give just one example-could run afoul of
the Due Process Clause.
Even so, this is no reason for the Committee to stay its hand.
Committee members should give serious weight to Supreme Court
dictum when the dictum is persuasive, and, of course, they should
not flout a clear constitutional decision. But when unconstitutional-
ity is only a possibility, the Committee's responsibility to design a
well-justified procedural system should take priority. The Commit-
tee should not stop short of adopting a sensible reform just because
there might be an adverse judicial response.
More generally, I believe the proper relationship between the
Committee and the Court is a dialogic one. Just as the Committee
should give weight to the Court's arguments, the Court should give
weight to the Committee's arguments when a reform is challenged
on constitutional grounds. For example, the Committee's well-justi-
fied views on the constitutionality of mandatory class treatment for
small-claim class actions should influence the Court's constitutional
analysis. In this way, the Committee actively leads rather than pas-
sively follows, and the Court can learn from the Committee's well-
considered judgments.
3. Rules Enabling Act
Section 2072(b) of the Rules Enabling Act ("REA proviso") bars
procedural rules that "abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive
right."95 This limitation creates particularly challenging problems
for Rule 23 because of the key role class actions play in implement-
ing substantive policies and the powerful impact that class
94. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2559 (2011).
95. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (b) (2006). Professor Stephen Burbank has persuasively argued that
the original purpose of this limitation was to protect separation of powers values by reserving
substantive regulation for Congress, but the federal courts have insisted on reading it in
federalism terms. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1015, 1106-12 (1982).
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certification can have on the distribution of power outside as well as
inside the litigation. 96 Yet there is no clear test for determining
when a Federal Rule abridges, enlarges, or modifies a substantive
right. The Supreme Court has construed the REA proviso on sev-
eral occasions, but its decisions are far from clear.
In an early statement on the issue, the Court held that a Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure satisfies the REA proviso if it "really regu-
lates procedure[ ]-the judicial process for enforcing rights and
duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them."97 This "re-
ally regulates procedure" test is singularly unhelpful: it provides
little guidance in distinguishing rules that "really" regulate proce-
dure from those that do not. Forty-six years later, the Court
elaborated by explaining that Federal Rules that only "incidentally
affect litigants' substantive rights" do not run afoul of the proviso,
especially when they are "reasonably necessary to maintain the in-
tegrity of [the] system of rules."98 But this test falls short as well. It is
not clear how to determine when a Federal Rule has only "inciden-
tal" effects and when its effects are sufficiently direct.
Most recently, in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insur-
ance Co.,99 a plurality of the Supreme Court revived the "really
regulates procedure" test and adopted a rather formalistic version
that almost entirely ignores the substantive effects of a Federal
Rule:
The test is not whether the rule affects a litigant's substantive
rights . . . [w]hat matters is what the rule itself regulates: If it
governs only 'the manner and the means' by which the liti-
gants' rights are 'enforced,' it is valid; if it alters 'the rules of
decision by which [the] court will adjudicate [those] rights,' it
is not. 00
As others have noted, this test adopts too simplistic a view of the
relationship between procedure and substance. 10' It would seem to
96. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Oppor-
tunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 17, 19 (2010) (arguing that because of these
factors, "the possibility that the entire [Rule 23] endeavor may have unfolded in violation of
the Enabling Act seems increasingly compelling, but the disruptive consequences of such a
conclusion would be unacceptable").
97. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).
98. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987).
99. 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
100. Id. at 1442.
101. See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 96, at 20, 63-66.
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approve a substantive regulation disguised as a Federal Rule as long
as the Rule on its face appears to regulate procedure.
Commentators offer various alternative tests. Some of these focus
on effects, others focus on purposes, and some consider both.1°2 My
own approach, detailed elsewhere, focuses on the Committee's jus-
tification for a rule.'0 3 The Advisory Committee acts properly if it
explicitly supports its rule choice with a substantial justification that
fits one or more of the purposes of civil adjudication-achieving a
fair distribution of error risk, reducing expected error or process
costs, or promoting process-based procedural fairness-so long as
the rule does not depart too much from core features of civil adju-
dication reflected in longstanding practice.'0 4
The Shady Grove plurality's test would seem to permit at least the
main Rule 23 reforms discussed in this Article. These reforms are
procedural on their face; they can be seen as regulating only the
manner and means by which litigants' rights are enforced. And al-
though they have substantive consequences, they do not directly
alter substantive rules of decision. Furthermore, my interpretation
of the REA proviso makes wide room for Rule 23 reforms that have
significant substantive effects. Roughly speaking, the Committee re-
spects the limitations of the REA proviso in my approach as long as
it proceeds with an eye to making Rule 23 a more sensible and co-
herent rule that better serves the goals of civil adjudication and
respects adjudication's core adversarial features. For example, the
Committee should be able to adopt a standard of proof for certifi-
cation even though its choice affects enforcement of the substantive
law, provided the Committee justifies its choice in terms of reduced
error costs. So too, the Committee should be able to carve out sub-
stance-specific exceptions for civil rights claims as long as it justifies
its exceptions in terms of the particularly high cost of failing to vin-
dicate meritorious rights-based claims.
In short, the current Advisory Committee should not shy away
from making Rule 23 a better version of the pragmatic and func-
tional rule the 1966 Committee meant to create. While REA
constraints must be taken seriously, the fact that Rule 23 can have a
102. See, e.g., id. at 44 (focusing primarily on whether the Federal Rule involves policy
choices that "predictably and directly affect rights under the substantive law");John Hart Ely,
The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REv. 693, 724-25 (1974) (focusing on whether the
Rule is "designed to make the process of litigation a fair and efficient mechanism for the
resolution of disputes").
103. Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy,
and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 950-54 (1999).
104. Id. at 951-52.
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powerful impact on substantive law enforcement and the distribu-
tion of power is not a sufficient reason alone to balk at otherwise
sensible reforms.
4. Transsubstantivity and Politics
The current Rule 23 is a "transsubstantive" rule, meaning that it
is written to apply broadly regardless of the nature of the underly-
ing substantive claim. There is a longstanding debate over the
virtues and vices of transsubstantive rules. 10 5 Those who favor
transsubstantivity might object to Rule 23 reforms that create sub-
stantive-specific rules or adopt general standards that explicitly
require consideration of substantive stakes.
For example, a revision of Rule 23 that adopted a fairly stiff stan-
dard of proof for certification but carved out exceptions for civil
rights and other types of suits with special social value would not be
transsubstantive. Also, the type of balancing test for choosing the
certification burden that I propose in Part II.B might be objectiona-
ble on transsubstantivity grounds because one of the factors refers
explicitly to the importance of the underlying substantive
interest1 0 6
I have argued elsewhere that transsubstantivity is not an intrinsic
virtue of procedural rules. 10 7 A primary purpose of procedure is to
manage the risks and costs of error, and error costs necessarily de-
pend on the importance of the substantive interest at stake. 0 8 In
fact, facially transsubstantive rules, like Rule 23, are often written in
general and open-ended language so trial judges can adapt them to
case-specific circumstances. 0 9 For example, judges sometimes bend
105. See e.g., Robert G. Bone, Securing the Normative Foundations of Litigation Reform, 86 B.U.
L. REV. 1155, 1160-63 (2006) (criticizing the transsubstantive ideal); Stephen B. Burbank, Of
Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. Rv.
693, 713-15 (1988) (discussing the shortcomings of uniform transsubstantive rules); Paul A.
Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of
Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2067, 2079-85 (1989) (de-
fending transsubstantive rules and describing how they implement principles of generalism
and flexibility).
106. Indeed, a particularly extreme proponent of transsubstantivity might even object to
making small-claim damage class actions mandatory but leaving large-claim class actions with
opt-out rights, on the ground that any such rule treats substantive laws that typically generate
small claims-securities fraud, antitrust, consumer protection, and the like-differently than
other substantive laws.
107. Bone, supra note 105.
108. Id. at 1160-63.
109. For a non-class-action example, ajudge might permit broader discovery in a major
civil rights case than in a routine negligence suit because the substantive stakes make out-
come error potentially more serious in the former than in the latter.
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over backwards to find 23(a) and (b)(3) requirements satisfied
when the class action is the most promising way to enforce impor-
tant policies embodied in the substantive law.110 It is hard to see
how transsubstantivity can be a virtue when Rules are applied in a
non-transsubstantive way.
To be sure, the Advisory Committee must still decide how to craft
a revised Rule 23, such as, for example, whether to draft it as a strict
rule or a more flexible standard and whether to frame it at a gen-
eral or more specific level. But these choices should be made by
balancing the costs and benefits and not by applying some mis-
guided principle of transsubstantivity.J 1"
There is one other concern. Even though a reform satisfies the
REA proviso and is otherwise well-justified, it might still trigger po-
litical controversy. The Committee should not ignore the political
risks of reexamining Rule 23. At the same time, it should not shy
away from reform simply because it fears sharp interest group con-
flict and possible congressional intervention. There will be times
when the Committee might have to settle for a suboptimal reform,
or maybe no reform at all, because the optimal version is too con-
troversial. Or it might have to exercise restraint in order to avoid
congressional meddling that threatens the integrity of the rulemak-
ing process. Still, the Committee should hesitate only in
exceptional circumstances, when political resistance is very strong
and failure extremely likely. 112
CONCLUSION
I have argued in this Article that the Advisory Committee should
reform Rule 23 to fulfill the 1966 Committee's vision of a pragmatic
Rule. To do this, the Committee must develop a functional account
of the day-in-court right and a coherent explanation of how that
110. See, e.g., In re Nassau Cnty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 230 (2d Cir. 2006)
(applying Rule 23 liberally to reverse denial of certification of a class of detainees and observ-
ing that "without class notification, most putative class members will not even know that they
suffered a violation of their constitutional rights").
111. See Bone, supra note 37, at 2002 (identifying as relevant the cost of making the rule,
the cost of applying it, and the benefits of predictability, among other factors).
112. The Advisory Committee should still formulate and publish its optimal rule even
when it decides not to adopt that rule in full because of political concerns. In this way, the
Committee will know what it is giving up, and the courts, Congress, and the broader legal
community can learn from Committee expertise. By an optimal rule, I mean one that not
only balances costs and benefits but also takes account of due process and REA limits. The
Committee can explain its decision to modify certain provisions, despite REA power to adopt
them, on the ground that the unmodified versions are better left to the legislative process
given the intense political controversy they engender.
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right fits with representative litigation. Furthermore, it must di-
rectly address the kinds of strategic abuse that plague class litigation
in all its different forms. None of the potential objections based on
precedent, due process, the Rules Enabling Act, or transsubstantiv-
ity are compelling. The political risks must be taken seriously, and
the Committee should do its best to manage them on an ongoing
basis. But it would be a shame if the risk of political conflict crip-
pled the Committee's efforts.
Some might think this project is folly. If the federal class action is
dead or in its final death throes, as some commentators claim,
there would be little point in amending Rule 23. But I do not be-
lieve that the situation is quite this dire. There will probably be
fewer class actions in the end, but the class action itself will still
survive.113 It is important, therefore, that the Advisory Committee
address restrictive decisions over the past fifteen years that involve
interpretations of Rule 23.
The class action is a critical component of modem civil adjudica-
tion. It plays an important role in easing unfair burdens, furnishing
remedies to help enforce the substantive law, and reducing the
costs of litigation when those costs are extremely high. However,
the current version of Rule 23 needs major repair if it is to promote
its goals in an optimal way. The future of the class action depends
on it.
113. Perhaps the most important development in this regard is the Court's decision in
AT&TMobilit) LLCv. Concepcion 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), which some critics claim could elimi-
nate the small-claim class action. See supra notes 4, 6 and accompanying text.
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